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Nationalization-privatization cycles
Nationalization is the transfer of ownership of
an asset or industry from the private sector to
the public sector. Privatization is the transfer
of such an asset from public to private
ownership. Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc
in the late 1980s, many observers have viewed
privatization as an inexorable historical trend.
Looked at over the past century, however, it
becomes clear that nationalization and privati-
zation have been locked into cyclical patterns
in most societies (Kobrin, 1984; Chua, 1995;
Chang et al., 2011). 
Struggles between proponents of national-
ization and privatization in developed
countries such as France and the United
Kingdom have been extensively chronicled
(Hall, 1986; Helm, 1989). Less well known are
the nationalization-privatization cycles that
have characterized regions such as Latin
America, southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan
Africa (Chua 1995). As Chua (p. 225)
observes, countries in these regions ‘have
been cycling back and forth between privati-
zation and nationalization for as long as they
have been independent’.
The first Latin American nationalization
programmes, in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and
Peru, came soon after independence struggles
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They
were succeeded by waves of privatization and
then further periods of nationalization. In
consequence, for most Latin American
countries, the 1990s privatization rush was
‘the fifth phase of a privatisation-nationali-
sation cycle’ (Chua, 1995, p. 227).
Southeast Asia remained under colonial
control until the 1950s. Colonial ‘free trade’
economies were fairly quickly set aside by
post-independence nationalization projects.
Subsequent privatizations in the 1990s
occurred in countries otherwise as diverse as
India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar.
Almost every country in the region has now
been through two or three alternations
between privatization and nationalization
(Chang et al., 2011). Sub-Saharan Africa, with
its generally later post-colonial settlements,
experienced a wave of nationalization and
indigenization in the 1960s and early 1970s
(Rood, 1976). This was followed by a strong
trend towards privatization in the 1980s and
1990s (Adams, 2008).
Economic analysis
This paper is concerned with how national-
ization-privatization cycles have been
explained, and what such explanations can
contribute to our understanding of the recent
nationalization debate in South Africa. In such
explanations, the contributions of economic
analysts play an unexpectedly minor role.
Economic theorists have not provided stable or
consistent advice to policy makers or reformers
– and they are unlikely to do so today in what
is a time of fresh upheaval in the discipline. 
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There are some points of consensus. Economists mostly
agree that a rejection of foreign and ‘internal foreign’ capital
and skills typically accompanies nationalization. Such a
rejection usually brings about capital shortages and skills
crises and so ultimately results in a forced return to such
foreign capital and expertise in a later privatization.
Changing ownership patterns, moreover, carry significant
transition costs that economists have highlighted (e.g. Mayer
and Meadowcroft, 1985). There are transaction costs
associated with legal and bureaucratic reorganization;
political and state legitimacy is undermined, which results in
lost production and declining investor confidence; and
economically destructive political violence may occur.
Moreover, nationalization makes future privatizations ever
more expensive; and privatization makes future national-
izations ever more costly (Chua, 1995, p. 476). 
Beyond such high-level generalizations, economic theory
does not offer policy makers much guidance about ownership
policy across economic sectors. The conventional general
economic arguments in favour of nationalization all lack
precision and cogency. Creating ‘essential’ infrastructure;
reducing inequality; controlling natural monopolies;
curtailing market price volatility; protecting employment;
regulating quality; providing public goods; and exerting
macro-economic policy influence: all of these purported
general justifications for nationalization are at best contin-
gently, and often only tangentially, related to questions of
ownership. 
Even during the most recent privatization wave of the
1980s and early 1990s, widespread political assertions about
the desirability of privatization were not intellectually
compelling. As Mayer (1990, p. 251) observed at the time,
the superior productive efficiency of private over public
companies had not been demonstrated by empirical studies.
While competition evidently makes firms more responsive to
consumer preferences, ownership is not directly related to, or
dependent upon, market structure. This disjuncture was
confirmed by the poorly considered creation of numerous
private monopolies during the 1980s and 1990s waves of
privatization (Mayer,  p. 252).
One inconclusive account of ownership fashions (Mayer,
1990, p. 270) hypothesizes a ‘life cycle in ownership
patterns’, with ‘private ownership occurring in the early
phases of technological innovation’ and ‘public control being
exercised thereafter as investment considerations diminish in
significance in relation to demand responses’. Public
ownership is prevalent in industries (such as postal services
or railways) in which technical innovation is sluggish,
recurrent investment expenditure is low, and demand
requirements are unpredictable. Private ownership, by
contrast, tends to dominate where technological advances
and the requirements of production bring about a need for
major capital expenditures. 
Since technical innovation leads to private ownership (for
example in telecommunications in recent decades), ownership
patterns will not be stable. Instead there will be national-
ization ‘life cycles’ as technical progress wanes (Mayer,
1990).
Political leaders have generally found revenue generation
to be the key attraction of privatization. The sale of public
assets has helped governments to escape public borrowing
constraints.  Inadequate accounting conventions in most
countries have inflated privatization receipts but failed
adequately to account for foregone future revenues.
A brisk overview of development economics orthodoxy
confirms the inconsistency and volatility of the policy advice
it has generated across decades in the global South. The
liberal tradition in economic analysis (which emerged in 18th
century Britain and understandably focused on the free
interaction of economic actors) has contended across the
period with European intellectual traditions that emerged in
state-led continental economies.
When development economics was consolidated as a
discipline in the 1940s and 1950s, its founders were
influenced by the experiences of the Great Depression, the
successful industrialization and war performance of the
Soviet Union, and a Keynesian revolution that emphasised
market failure and active government (Lewis, 1954; Myrdal,
1957; Hirschman, 1958). The structuralist approach to
economic development that became the development
orthodoxy from the 1950s demanded an active state to
accelerate economic development, overcome market failures,
and allocate resources for investment –- and it therefore
found a significant role for state-owned enterprises.
Such intellectual support for interventionism was
reversed after the anti-Keynesian revolution in macroeco-
nomics in the late 1960s and 1970s, the collapse of socialist
economies in the latter half of the 1980s, and the emergence
of the ‘Washington consensus’ around the merits of economic
liberalization, privatization, and fiscal stabilization
programmes. 
In this period, a temporary consensus emerged among
orthodox liberal economists concerning the costs of national-
ization. Nationalization was viewed as an imprudent policy
choice that brings with it negative economic consequences.
Capital flight, increasing productive inefficiency, bureaucrati-
zation, and corruption are all routinely cited as consequences
of nationalization. Where markets are cyclical (as with
commodities), state-owned companies are unable to shed
labour and invest in hard times, because these enterprises are
used to soak up unemployed labour and to provide
governments with dividend flows during economic
downturns. Governments may be forced to borrow heavily to
reduce public deficits while state-owned enterprises continue
to languish. Privatization, in this view, is seen as a rational
response to the negative consequences of previous waves of
nationalization.
In recent years, the experiences of the newly industri-
alised ‘developmental states’ of East Asia and the emergence
of claims about a Chinese ‘state capitalist’ model have
resurrected interest in the role of the state, and state-owned
enterprises, in economic development (Edigheji, 2009). 
In sum, economic theorists have not provided stable or
consistent advice to policy makers about state ownership and
they are unlikely to do so in a time of fresh upheaval in the
discipline. In such circumstances, economic theory has been
selectively drawn upon by political actors rather than
informing their policy choices.
Ideological drivers and exogenous events
Nationalization and privatization have attracted the attention
of political activists from left and right. Contestation about
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the appropriate reach of private property ownership has raged
across the 20th century and into the 21st. The Marxist
tradition, and the wide range of intellectual approaches that
have drawn upon it, emphasises the evils of exploitation and
alienation in capitalist society. Leftist ideologues have
claimed that rational planning can banish inequity and
disorder from economic development. Pro-nationalization
ideologists have often drawn upon discontent with labour
exploitation and unemployment. Ideology has worked both
ways –- in the aftermath of the Soviet empire’s collapse,
liberal ideologues rode a wave of sentiment in favour of
market allocation and private property.
Privatization-nationalization cycles, however, have not
been coordinated across the globe (Chua, 1995). This
suggests that global ideological shifts and geopolitical
changes can explain only a part of these cycles. Institutional
changes that occur at times of crisis and upheaval
(Sturzenegger and Tommasi, 1998) often fail to endure.
Duncan (2005) finds no link between expropriations in the
resources sector and political or economic crises (except at
independence).
Nationalization and nationalism
The limited comparative research that is available in this area
indicates that non-economic and non-ideological factors have
played a decisive role in shaping nationalization projects.
Postcolonial political elites have to manage complex class and
ethnic divisions. Periods of post-liberation elite accumulation
have resulted in the perceived (and often real) enrichment of
particular racial or ethnic groups. Minority enrichment
provides a focus for political mobilization and for the creation
of nationalist movements seeking ‘majority’ empowerment. 
Chua (1995) argues persuasively that nationalization in
developing countries has mostly been an expression of
nationalism rather than socialism. Such hostile nationalist
sentiment has been aimed at foreigners (usually ‘Western
imperialists’) but also at the ‘foreigner within’. Such
‘internally directed nationalism’ (Chau, 1995, p. 359)
involves the labelling of specific ethnic or racial groups as
exploiters. 
In south-east Asia, Chua notes that the ‘double targeting’
of foreigners and ‘foreigners within’ has resulted in a prolif-
eration of slogans such as ‘Malay-Malaysia’, ‘Thailand for
the Thai’, and ‘Filipino First’, at the expense of national
ethnic minorities. In Latin American countries, national-
ization movements have included anti-elitist and anti-aristo-
cratic demands. In Africa, European settlers, Indian
minorities, and historically privileged African ethnic groups
have all become the objects of nationalizing actors’ scorn.
Why resources?
These factors have made it possible for pro-nationalization
sentiment to be mobilized by astute political entrepreneurs.
The cost and obstacles to both privatization and national-
ization, however, have impeded transfers of ownership in
many sectors. Privatization-nationalization cycles have
occurred most frequently in the natural resources and utilities
sectors (Kobrin, 1984; Chua, 1995; Chang et al., 2011).
Chang et al. argue that oil, minerals resources, and monopoly
utilities offer the most easily accessible forms of economic
rent that can be tapped for a variety of political and economic
purposes.
A number of factors increase the likelihood of national-
ization of mineral resources and oil. First, the extraction of
resources involves a combination of large sunk costs and
significant rents. This makes nationalization tempting in the
short to medium term. Second, non-renewable natural
resources generate emotional attachments in societies that
are ‘rooted in the soil’. If they are non-renewable resources,
their exploitation is perceived as a one-off extraction of
wealth. As the price of commodities increases, demands for
expropriation rise and, as Duncan (2006) shows, such
demands are more regularly translated into action: national-
ization of natural resource industries usually occurs when
commodity prices are high.
Third, policy makers can become dismayed by the
proportion of ‘windfall gains’ from high commodity prices
that accrues to private firms, largely as a result of the legal
contracts that govern the exploitation of natural resources.
Such firms are either foreign domiciled or they are perceived
to belong to ‘internal foreigners’. Fourth, the dismay of policy
makers is greatest where formerly state-owned miners have
been privatized in advance of a commodity boom, so missing
out (heartbreakingly) on an unexpected expansion of
economic rents. 
Fifth, an extended commodity price boom, such as that
driven today by growth in the major Asian economies, will
result in rising exchange rates among resource producers.
This can result in ‘Dutch disease’ and associated de-industri-
alization (Breisinger and Thurlow, 2008). If mining assets lie
in private and foreign hands, the costs of rising exchange
rates are born by the non-resource economy, while profits are
largely remitted abroad to foreign companies (Breisinger and
Thurlow,  p. 19).
Finally, various other factors may increase political
pressure for nationalization: the prevalence of societal
inequality; the ‘colour coding’ of resource boom beneficiaries
by race or ethnicity; and the presence of ‘faulty public
institutions’ that erode the rule of law (Chang et al., 2011).
State-owned enterprises have dominated the resources
sector in many countries beyond the Soviet bloc. Finland,
Sweden, and Norway have nurtured highly productive state-
owned mining companies. Countries such as China, Chile,
India, Iran, Sweden, and Poland continue to operate with
significant state-owned mining capacity. The demonstrable
successes of at least some state-owned mining companies
have added credibility to the demands of pro-nationalization
lobbies.
The negative consequences that nationalization can bring
tend to be forgotten in times of high commodity demand. The
expulsion of foreign and ‘internal foreign’ capital and skills
during nationalization projects typically results later in capital
shortages and skills crises. Ultimately it obliges governments
to privatize in pursuit of renewed foreign capital and
expertise investments. State-owned companies tend to serve
as employment reservoirs during economic downturns, at
which times governments also turn to them for fiscal support.
Privatization is therefore a common counter-reaction to the
travails of state-owned enterprise in that it once again
permits the accessing of skills and capital.
Resource nationalism and the African National Congress
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Nationalization, resource nationalism, and the ANC
A wide range of factors that have been associated historically
with resource nationalism in general, and with national-
ization in particular, are present today in South Africa. We
should therefore be unsurprised that the environment has
been conducive to demands for mine nationalization. This
part of the paper explores how political actors within the
African National Congress (ANC) advanced their concrete
proposals for state involvement in the mining sector and so
made use of the opportunities presented to them by the
external environment.
There are two proximate explanations for the emergence
of mine nationalization on the policy agenda of the ANC.
First, it was the product of factional contestation within the
liberation movement. The purported mine nationalization
policy advanced by the ANC’s Youth League (ANCYL, 2010)
was intended to undercut the legitimacy of the South African
Communist Party (SACP), and to exploit internal and
especially generational divisions within the party over
economic policy. The choice of the mining sector for this
initiative also exacerbated tensions within the Congress of
South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the National Union
of Mineworkers (NUM), organizations that have been at the
core of the leftist faction of the ANC. 
Second, the mine nationalization proposal was advanced
in an attempt to bounce ANC leaders and wider social
interests into accepting ‘compromise proposals’ that have
probably included a state-owned mining company, a resource
rent tax, and a more aggressively enforced black economic
empowerment programme. Some of the project’s architects
may also have their sights set on a wider reconfiguration of
public sector asset governance.
Mine nationalization and ANC factionalism
Nationalization appeared on the political agenda of the ANC
in the second half of 2009. The reappearance of this seeming
anachronism came as some surprise to political observers.
The liberation movement’s Polokwane resolutions of
December 2007 were moderate and social-democratic,
focusing on ‘decent work’, social equality, rising productivity,
cutting-edge technology, labour-absorbing growth,
competitive markets, and efficient management (ANC, 2007).
The left advanced mostly modest demands (with the
exception of national health insurance, a major development
beyond the scope of this paper): a progressive realization of
socio-economic rights, fair labour practices, social security for
the poor, universal access to basic services, and on-going
programmes to defeat poverty.
The conference endorsed ‘a mixed economy, where the
state, private capital, cooperative and other forms of social
ownership complement each other’ (ANC, 2007). It accepted
that ‘the changes we seek will not emerge spontaneously
from the ”invisible hand” of the market ... the state must play
a central and strategic role, by directly investing in underde-
veloped areas and directing private sector investment.’ 
However, the rhetoric of a ‘developmental state’,
purportedly able to ‘lead in the definition of a common
national agenda, mobilize society to take part in the
implementation of that agenda and direct resources towards
realising these objectives’, had displaced demands for public
ownership. The developmental state will be ‘located at the
centre of a mixed economy’ and ‘lead and guide that
economy ... in the interest of the people as a whole’ (ANC,
2007).
There was to be ‘an institutional centre for government-
wide economic planning’ responsible for ‘integration,
harmonisation and alignment of planning and implemen-
tation across all three spheres of government’. The develop-
mental state was to have greater human and technical
capacity and to maintain its strategic role of ‘shaping the key
sectors of the economy’ including ‘the mineral and energy
complex and the national transport and logistics system’
(ANC, 2007).
Polokwane paid conventional obeisance to the Freedom
Charter’s ‘vision of the economic transformation’, and
resolved to take as its starting point ‘the Freedom Charter’s
clarion call that the People Shall Share in the Country’s
Wealth!’ Notwithstanding this almost reflexive commitment,
there was not a single reference to nationalization or social-
ization in the Polokwane resolutions.
A vulnerable Communist Party
The SACP’s convoluted relationship to the nationalization
project results from its history as a racial and organizational
vehicle. It allowed white and Indian activists to help lead the
anti-apartheid struggle at a time when the ANC leadership
positions were reserved to Africans. It also helped racial
minorities to participate on equal terms in the ‘military
struggle’ against the apartheid regime.
The SACP was an organizational vehicle because only the
‘most advanced cadres’ were recruited. Membership was a
mark of prestige, a guarantee of advancement, and the key to
accessing resources for travel and military training. By the
middle of the 1980s, the overwhelming majority of senior
exile ANC leaders were members.
The SACP therefore lived a curious dual existence. Its
members were the ‘best and the brightest’ and they had
unrivalled opportunities to observe at first hand the demerits
of central planning. These cadres were therefore imbued with
deep pessimism about the prospects of a socialist economy.
Since the party had succeeded in getting the ANC to adopt
quasi-communist positions on almost every aspect of the
struggle, however, the ANC was more unquestioningly
‘socialist’ than the SACP itself.
SACP leaders’ antipathy towards nationalization was
evident in 1990 as exiles began their return to South Africa.
In July of that year, soon after his return to South Africa,
then SACP general secretary Joe Slovo (1990) told a radio
audience that ‘We do not believe that the transfer of
ownership from a board of directors to a board of bureaucrats
will solve our economic problem’. Essop Pahad, already an
important interlocutor between the party and the nationalist
centre of the ANC, observed that ‘the extent of [state]
intervention must be determined by a whole lot of factors of
which we are not even in control’. Jeremy Cronin (1991)
noted that ‘if you take away from Anglo American a whole
lot of the economy, and then give it over to a bunch of
bureaucrats, workers have not been empowered, bureaucrats
have’. 
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Although the SACP leadership had internalized the social
democratic wisdom of the time, the party’s legitimacy still
depended upon its purportedly dialectical materialist
understanding of southern African capitalism. The SACP’s
unaccountable power and disproportionately white and
Indian composition meant that much rested on its avowed
access to scientific truths about society. 
Meanwhile, ordinary SACP members were markedly more
likely than the party’s leadership to view nationalization as a
real, if long-range, policy objective. When the party vastly
expanded its once select membership after 2002, a growing
proportion of its active base no longer understood the
subtlety (or perhaps hypocrisy) of its nationalization-but-
not-now agenda. A growing body of opinion understandably
believed that a communist party must be committed to some
form of public ownership. 
The Young Communist League
The re-launch of the Young Communist League (YCL) in
2003 exacerbated these tensions. General Secretary Blade
Nzimande called the reestablishment of the YCL ‘an historic
event’ that ended the underground era that started in 1950
with the Suppression of Communism Act. In truth, the SACP
leadership failed to plan how to induct a new mass
membership into the convoluted intellectual life of the old
Party.
As the SACP and YCL became mass organizations in the
mid-2000s, their leaderships underwent a precipitous decline
in capability. The early 1990s collapse of the Soviet empire
had long since precipitated the flight of strategists such as
Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. Along with many others they
tore up (or did not renew) their SACP membership cards. 
In 2007, the residual SACP became sharply divided by the
factional contest between Mbeki and Zuma. The SACP’s
national conference culminated in the ejection of most of the
party’s senior government ministers and officials, and in a
corresponding loss of political and intellectual capital.
The SACP’s rise into a mass movement coincided with the
erosion of its real capacity to formulate practical policy
alternatives. Ordinary members understandably laboured
under the misconception that the party was socialist in
orientation, and that socialism must include a commitment to
public ownership. Meanwhile, the leadership was reconciled
to the long-range character of the communist project, and to
its own limited role as a corrective influence or guiding hand
behind the evolution of the wider ANC.
The result, by the time of the divisive 12th National
Congress of the SACP in July 2007, was confusion. The
congress resolved to support ‘state-led industrial policy’,
‘labour-intensive manufacturing’ and other social-democratic
palliatives. Meanwhile, resolutions were also adopted (SACP,
2007) demanding the nationalization of ‘strategic’ companies
such SASOL and Mittal Steel, with the ‘ultimate objective of
nationalizing and socializing the commanding heights of the
economy in line with the vision of the Freedom Charter’. (The
key word in this resolution, ‘ultimate’, indicates that the
party leadership had no intention whatsoever of realizing this
commitment.) 
In the post-Polokwane SACP, however, a vastly expanded
and economically illiterate membership was asking with
some urgency what actions the left should propose for
Zuma’s administration. Nationalization emerged as the
preference of the party’s youth wing. 
The ANC-aligned unions
The SACP’s partner in the tripartite alliance, the Congress of
South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), played little initial role
in debates over nationalization. Its national congresses have
reiterated the federation’s commitment to leftist nostrums
such as ‘state-led interventions in the economy’, industrial
policy, and collectivist models of ownership. Cosatu’s 10th
national congress (Cosatu, 2009) did observe that ‘only a
centrally planned socialist economy can deliver the workers
and the marginalised poor from ... the present day economic
[and] social culture of slavery and misery’, and the same
congress admittedly resolved to ‘vigorously campaign for the
nationalisation of the commanding heights of the economy,
under workers’ control, as a route to a centrally planned
socialist economy’ (Cosatu, 2009). Such expressions of
emotion, however, were not backed by any systematic
analysis of potential mechanisms of, or pathways towards,
nationalization or central planning.
Cosatu is undergoing a significant structural change. The
federation has historically been dominated by mineworker,
industrial, chemical, and textile worker unions. Key leaders
of the tripartite alliance – including Gwede Mantashe and
Zwelinzima Vavi – began their political careers in the
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). In recent years,
however, public sector unions representing teachers, health
workers, and local government employees have achieved
parity of numbers with their industrial union counterparts.
The commanding position of the NUM – evident since 1985
when it sent more than a third of the total delegates to the
founding congress – has eroded.
The NUM has also suffered internal tensions after two
decades of fitful progress for ordinary mineworkers. NUM
has taken a conservative position on economic policy issues
in recent years, calling for education and skills training, an
integrated approach to growth, and economic summits with
social partners. NUM conferences have scarcely deliberated
nationalization, and the leadership has steered conference
delegates towards demands for ‘meaningful government
participation’ in the economic life of the country (NUM,
2006).  
The left faction’s vulnerability
A simplified model of ANC factional conflicts explains the
vulnerability of the left to a symbolic demand for mine
nationalization. ANC internal politics are fluid and multi-
dimensional, and unstable alliances between regions and
provinces play a key role in list-creating, leadership, and
policy processes. Nevertheless, there are three relatively
coherent national-level factions currently in play. The first,
which might be called the organized left, includes the broad
leaderships of the SACP and Cosatu. The second, which we
might label the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) group, is organized
around the ANC and its tripartite alliance partners in that
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province. The third, the faction of the entrepreneurs, is
centred in Gauteng but has national reach facilitated by the
ANCYL among other agencies.
The call for mine nationalization has exposed the
hypocrisy and dissembling of the organized left’s strategists,
and opened up divisions between leaders and ordinary
activists. SACP deputy general secretary Jeremy Cronin has
fronted the party’s response to the call, most prominently in
two articles published in party journal Umsebenzi in
November 2009. The first article, ‘Should we nationalise the
mines?’ took a robust approach to the Youth League’s
impertinence by questioning the motives of ANCYL president
Julius Malema (Cronin, 2009a). This personalization, clearly
anticipated by Malema’s strategists, allowed the rapid racial-
ization of the debate and the characterization of Cronin as a
‘white messiah’.
The normally adroit Cronin adopted a patronizing tone,
first relating the history of the Freedom Charter and then
decrying nationalization as a product of the consciousness of
the mid-1950s: ‘The framers of the Freedom Charter’, he
insisted, ‘were almost certainly thinking of some kind of
nationalization as a MEANS to ensuring ownership by ”the
people as a whole”’. Cronin, like Slovo before him, bewailed
‘a narrow bureaucratic take-over by the state apparatus and a
ruling party’s “deployees”’, and explained that ‘this is why
the SACP also prefers in general to refer to ”socialisation”
rather than ”nationalisation”’. The SACP’s longstanding
efforts to distinguish nationalization (ownership transfer and
bureaucratization) from socialization (democratic popular
control), however, have made almost no impact on the
movement’s policy debate.
The SACP deputy general secretary sarcastically observed
that ‘nationalising mining houses in the current global and
national recession might have the unintended consequence of
simply baling [sic] out indebted private capital, especially
BEE mining interests’. Nationalization would ‘land the state
with the burden of managing down many mining sectors in
decline [and] burden the state with the responsibility for
dealing with the massive (and historically ignored) cost of
“externalities”’. Cronin (2009a) also increased the stakes by
suggesting (presumably rhetorically) that nationalizing the
mines need not involve monetary compensation: ‘What about
straightforward expropriation without compensation?’
Cronin’s second intervention (2009b) was deeply
defensive and demonstrated the resonance of the national-
ization idea. ‘None of this means that we should simply rule
out the question of nationalising the mines ... the SACP has
never ruled this out. But it does mean that you don’t
necessarily need to nationalise mining operations to achieve
major immediate transformational objectives.’ Nationalization
‘runs the danger of wittingly or unwittingly serving the
interests of monopoly capital in SA and its comprador and
parasitic allies’. Malema’s sponsors had succeeded in opening
up deep cracks between the SACP and the YCL. By early the
next year, the YCL openly stated its support for the national-
ization of mines (YCL, 2010). ‘There has never been
ambiguity in this regard. We have always called for not only
the nationalisation of mines, but also that of steel, SASOL,
and the key sectors of our economy. We will continue to work
with the ANC Youth League in this regard ... We believe that
progressive nationalisation should ultimately lead towards
the socialisation of the commanding heights of the economy.’ 
Similar divisions emerged between Cosatu House and
some of the labour federation’s provincial executives.
Cosatu’s Gauteng structures voiced their support for the
ANCYL’s nationalization project in early 2012. National
executive and central committee meetings of Cosatu and the
SACP have found themselves unable to formulate a unified
and coherent response to the ANCYL proposals. 
By the start of 2012, the federation had drifted away
from the position set out by Cronin and the SACP leadership.
Decrying the populism of the Youth League, a June 2011 joint
SACP-Cosatu statement argued that nationalization would
benefit only a corrupt elite. Yet the faction of the Cosatu
leadership that is seeking the eviction of Zuma from the ANC
presidency in 2012 (led by Zwelinzima Vavi) is increasingly
using nationalization to destabilize the Zuma campaign, as
part of a rapprochement with the current anti-Zuma
leadership of the ANCYL.
The vagueness of Youth League proposals
The ANCYL’s sponsors were evidently interested in
promoting a powerful state mining company: this objective is
set out very clearly in the League’s February 2010 position
paper or framework document on the nationalization of
mines (ANCYL, 2010). The framework document noted that
nationalization ‘is not a panacea for SA’s developmental
challenges, but it should in the manner we are proposing it,
entail democratising the commanding heights of the
economy, to ensure they are not just legally owned by the
state, but that they are thoroughly democratised and
controlled by the people.’ The paper observed that ‘other
strategic sectors of the economy should be transferred to the
ownership of the people as a whole’, and apologized for its
‘thematic’ focus on just ‘the transfer of Mineral wealth to the
ownership and benefit of the people.’
The analysis was largely banal: ‘Democratic, open and
decisive legislation will ensure that all Mineral Wealth is used
for the benefit of the people ... Nationalisation should be
accompanied by thorough transformation of state-owned
enterprises ... to benefit the people as a whole ... The
Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act
(MPRDA) was designed to release the monopoly stranglehold
of five mining investment houses and allow entry by the
aspirant black middle class entry into the mining industry ...
[but] has benefited only a small comprador elite’ (ANCYL
2010).
Nationalization would supposedly fill treasury coffers,
improve working conditions, aid industrialization, safeguard
sovereignty, transform South Africa’s accumulation path,
reduce unemployment, transfer skills, produce cheaper
energy, and transform spatial development patterns. Energy
security, another ostensible objective, was also explored (by a
second anonymous author). A state-owned and controlled
coal mining company would directly provide coal for power
generation ‘without the hustles [sic] of the present coal
mining corporations, who are always ready to qualitatively
and quantitatively under-supply ESKOM in pursuit of bigger
profits’ (ANCYL 2010).

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Eventually the paper got to the point by setting out three
options, which it labelled (a), (b), and (c), for the future of
the sector.  ‘In no preferential sequence’, it suggested, ‘the
ANC government should, (a) establish a State Mining
Company; (b) put in place a democratic, open and clearly
defined expropriation (with and without compensation)
model; and (c) amend the Minerals and Petroleum Resources
Development Act (MPRDA) to allow greater State partici-
pation in the exploration, extraction, production, processing,
trading and beneficiation of Mineral Resources in South
Africa’ (ANCYL 2010).
An unpersuasive case for nationalization 
Option (b), democratic expropriation ‘with or without
compensation’, would seem to be the ‘scare’ or bluff that was
designed to cower reasoning opponents into making
concessions. The legal, economic, administrative, and
political complexities of such an undertaking are beyond the
capabilities, and even imaginations, of ministers and
officials. 
The ANCYL paper discussed Section 25 of the consti-
tution (the ‘property clause’) at some length and concluded
that the ANC’s interpretation of the section ‘should not be
narrowly legalistic, and in the process falling [sic] into the
scope of counter-transformation and reactionary
Constitutionalists, whose interests is [sic] to solidify the
imbalances and inequalities of the past ... Concretely, the
ANC should utilise its capacity to lead society, parliament and
government to re-introduce the Expropriation Bill in
Parliament, which clearly spell out how the State should
expropriate Mines and other property in the public interest
without or with compensation, depending on the balance of
probabilities’ (ANCYL, 2010). The incoherence of this
analysis indicates that option (b) was not seriously being
pursued by the sponsors of the framework document.
Building the DMR empire?
Option (a), the creation of a state-owned mineral company,
and option (c), amendment of MPRDA, therefore represented
the accommodation or compromise that NGC delegates were
encouraged to endorse in the ANC’s National General Council
in September 2010. Option (a), the creation of a single state-
owned mining company, had been on the cards for many
years. The ANCYL paper proposed establishing such a
company, and housing within it current publicly owned
assets such as Alexkor, the state diamond trader, provincial
agencies with mining interests, and the state’s shareholdings
in SASOL. ‘This perspective’, the paper continued, ‘is fully
aware of the existence of the State-owned African
Exploration Mining & Finance Corporation (AEMFC). The
functions and mandate of the AEMFC [primarily a coal
miner] should be consistent with the principle established
here [and] be integrated into the State Owned Mining
Company whose responsibilities are outlined above’ 
AEMFC has fallen under the Central Energy Fund and
therefore the Department of Energy. Alexkor has been a DPE
entity. ‘The State Mining Company’, the ANCYL firmly
insisted ‘will be under the direct supervision of the
Department of Mineral Resources’ (formerly Department of
Minerals and Energy). The framework document therefore
repackaged the longstanding ambitions of the minerals
department and created a context within which the broader
political and administrative power of the department could be
further enhanced.
According to the ANCYL, the new state entity would ‘own
and control’ South Africa’s mineral resources, maximize
national economic gains, contribute to national development,
and develop and maintain strong environmental and safety
standards. The company would develop mineral resources ‘in
a careful and deliberate manner’, and it would ‘not be run
like a private business corporation whose extent of progress
is solely measured through the amount of profit generated’.
Proposed beneficiation policy was also a longstanding
interest of the DMR. The department has been at the
forefront of beneficiation policy despite its limited capacity to
coordinate investments in research, trade, energy, and skills
policy, as beneficiation policy requires if it is to have any
chance of success. The DMR’s recent proposals instead
demand wide and discretionary licensing conditions for
precious metals use, in effect extending its disastrously
inefficient and politicized licensing empire to downstream
industries.
Corporate welfare
Proposal (c) was to ‘amend the Minerals and Petroleum
Resources Development Act’. This act has hitherto compelled
companies applying for mining rights to have 30 per cent
ownership and control by historically disadvantaged South
Africans. The ANCYL framework document proposed that
this should be amended to a requirement for a ‘partnership
with the state owned mining company, wherein the state
owns not less than 60 per cent of the shares and right of
determination ... The amended Act should apply to new
mining licences and all those who seek to renew their
licenses.’ 
The new state entity might well act as SACP deputy
general secretary Cronin predicted by rescuing over-leveraged
miners from their own bad decisions, and shifting to the
people as a whole responsibility for the mines’ environmental
legacies. (The people shall share in the country’s toxic
wastes!) At the September 2010 National General Council of
the ANC, prominent businesspeople Tokyo Sexwale
(Mvelaphanda Resources and Human Settlements minister)
and Bridget Radebe (Mmakau Mining) supported the Youth
League’s call, adding weight to both the ‘bail-out’ and Zuma-
destabilization explanations for the nationalization
proposals.
Public asset integration
The proposal suggested that the state miner would act, in
effect, as a BEE partner. It was not made clear how its
activities would be financed. One possibility was that the
creation of a new state-owned miner would provide a
rationale for reorganizing the governance of public sector
assets, most notably those safeguarded by the Public
Investment Corporation (PIC). Former DMR director general
Sandile Nogxina floated the idea that a ‘level of integration’
is required between the state miner and the PIC (a change
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that would presumably require amendments to the PIC Act).
The public sector entities on whose behalf PIC invests are
unionized workers’ pension and provident funds. For this
reason, the left has been wary about amendments to the PIC’s
investment mandate and governance. 
From Durban to Mangaung
The ANCYL’s initial mine nationalization proposals therefore
appear to have been primarily symbolic or instrumental. They
were motivated by ANC factional politics and by the desire of
various interests within and outside the ANC to secure
‘compromise’ alternatives such as corporate welfare and an
expanded DMR empire. They may also have been introduced
in order to justify the accessing of public sector assets for
‘developmental’ and other purposes.
The ANC initiated an unusual mining sector policy review
process in the run-up to its 53rd elective conference, held in
Mangaung in December 2012. At its September 2010 NGC in
Durban, the ANC had decided to investigate the ownership of
mineral resources and to defer a ‘final’ decision to the
Mangaung conference.
The process
Responsibility for overseeing research around nationalization
was delegated to the ANC’s National Executive Committee by
the NGC. Immediately after the NGC, the NEC resolved to
appoint researchers to ‘investigate successful models that
could be considered on the role of the state in mining’,
promising a report to the NEC on the work in the last quarter
of 2011 ‘in preparation for our policy conference in 2012’.
The NEC is the ANC’s sovereign decision-making body
between conferences. The NEC delegated responsibility for
research and analysis to its Economic Transformation
Committee (ETC), a subcommittee of the NEC. The ETC is one
of the most stable and influential deliberative bodies within
the movement, and it has played a central role (under former
chair Max Sisulu) in both entrenching conservative fiscal
policy and in the development of Black Economic
Empowerment policy. 
The committee’s policy chair, at the time of this review,
was Enoch Godongwana, the then Deputy Minister of
Economic Development, who had been a member of the NEC
only since 2007. Godongwana has a background in the
labour movement, having served as general secretary of the
National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (1994-7)
before moving into Eastern Cape Provincial government,
serving ultimately as MEC for Finance after 2004. The
committee’s 25-strong membership included planning
minister Trevor Manuel, SACP deputy general secretary
Jeremy Cronin, provincial premiers Zweli Mkhize and Ace
Magashule, and liberation movement intellectuals Joel
Netshitenzhe and Valli Moosa. The steering committee
created to oversee the activities of the research team and to
formulate an analytical response for the NEC comprised only
the members of the ETC (and not, as the ANCYL proposed,
representatives from other committees and alliance partner
bodies). 
The ETC presented its first report on the ANC ‘research’
initiative in early 2012 in the ‘SIMS’ (State Intervention in
the Minerals Sector) document (ANC, 2012). Research was
conducted on the role of the state in minerals in 12 countries:
Chile, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Zambia, Brazil, Venezuela,
Namibia, Botswana, Malaysia, China, and Australia. The
research team comprised Dr Paul Jourdan, formerly of the
Department of Trade and Industry and Mintek, Professor
Pundy Pillay of the University of the Witwatersrand, and
Professor Margaret Chitiga-Mabugu of the Human Sciences
Research Council.
The ETC used the SIMS report to formulate proposals that
were considered at the ANC’s policy conference in June 2012.
That policy conference instructed the NEC to prepare further
analytical materials for the landmark elective conference in
December 2012.
No prospect of nationalization proper
The composition of the ETC and that of the research task
team both indicated that radical proposals for nationalization
were highly unlikely to be forthcoming. Influential ANC and
trade union voices, moreover, demonstrated no enthusiasm
for expropriation with or without compensation. Research
team member Jourdan (2010) had previously argued that
nationalization ‘could have extremely negative impacts on
growth and development, including negative perceptions by
investors, massive increases in debt to finance expropriation
and a decline in operational efficiency resulting in job losses
as a result of the generally poor record in running state-
owned enterprises’. Objectives such as increasing fiscal
capacity, industrialization, spatial development and job
creation could, he claimed, be better achieved by a variety of
other policy measures (Jourdan, 2010). 
Former presidency policy head and planning commission
member Joel Netshitenzhe has remained an influential voice
for the rational centre of the ANC. He has observed that the
key obstacles to investment in South Africa’s minerals sector
in recent years have been ‘infrastructure bottlenecks, long
lead-times in acquiring machinery, the volatility of the
exchange rate, insufficient capacity within the then DME in
the early days of MPRDA implementation and slow
processing of environmental impact assessments … The
challenge, quite clearly, is not whether the mines are in state
hands or not … Even if the mines were owned by the state,
without a sector plan, there would be no strategic logic to
activities in the sector’ (Netshitenzhe, 2010). Netshitenzhe
also pointed to the problem of ‘capacity and integrity’ of
deployed ANC cadres in a sector that has ‘high lootability’
(Netshitenzhe, 2010, p. 21; see also Netshitenzhe, 2011).
The NUM meanwhile  argued that the MPRDA already gives
effect to the Freedom Charter’s call for nationalization, and
that ‘full scale nationalisation’ should be avoided in favour of
a ‘strategic fund/strategic equity model’ of nationalization
(NUM, 2011).
The ANC’s policy process remained quite strongly
insulated against populist uprisings or politicized
mobilization. The Mangaung conference of the movement, as
we shall see, was not presented with an opportunity to
contemplate highly destructive proposals for change.
State Intervention in the Minerals Sector (SIMS)
The ANC discussion document on State Intervention in the
Minerals Sector (SIMS) tells us more about the liberation 

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movement’s policy process than about the design of a
benevolent mining regime (ANC, 2012). SIMS had some
positive features. It advanced credible proposals for a
resource rent tax (RRT) – although this idea was discussed in
the state presidency in the era of Thabo Mbeki and so it was
hardly the research team’s discovery. Jourdan (2011, p. 44)
had already proposed a ‘mineral resource licensing regime’
for all African states that would include a ‘rate of return’
resource rent tax (RRT).  Godongwana has voiced support for
a similar intervention, and informal proposals also circulated
in the presidency policy unit during the Mbeki era. RRTs are
orthodox instruments. It will obviously be important to
design a flexible system that can endure changing conditions
while also reserving sufficient returns for investors to
compensate them for capital employed and for risk. RRT has
the merit of being a relatively non-distorting tax that could
be administered by the South African Revenue Service. It
could in principle be used to diversify the economy and to
compensate other sectors for resource boom-induced high
exchange rates, perhaps through the creation of a sovereign
resource wealth fund (another SIMS proposal). The document
also sensibly encouraged further state involvement in
exploration, research and development, and infrastructure.
Less positively, SIMS also rubber-stamped a proposal that
was set out in the ANC Youth League’s phoney national-
ization drive. Pension monies managed by the Public
Investment Commission are protected against the wolves
even when they are invested in mining companies. So too are
(or should be) the pension and provident funds of ordinary
mineworkers. SIMS suggests that such assets, set aside to
provide for the sunset years of ordinary folk, should be
transferred into special purpose vehicles in the service of
supposedly developmental objectives (ANC, 2012). In reality
such instruments could be abused to fund corporate welfare
for the politically connected.
Lukewarm but tangible support for the consolidation of
state mining assets into a state-owned mining company may
be significant. Although NUM, like the ANCYL, has argued
that private investors should be obliged to partner with such
a company, Netshitenzhe (2010) expressed an emerging
consensus that such a vehicle’s asset base ‘be expanded or
reduced through normal processes of acquisition and disposal
provided for in the country’s statutes and without imposing
an unnecessary burden on the fiscus’. There is strong
opposition to the creation of a company that might act as an
instrument of corporate welfare for politically connected mine
owners, or for the diversion of public assets (such as pension
fund monies) to fund speculative or patronage-fuelled
investments.
Mangaung
It appeared in the run-up to Mangaung that the abandonment
of nationalization proposals could be traded against a wish
list of interventions that have been presented by assorted
interest groups within the ANC, government, and trade
unions. Mining companies, it appeared, might be obliged to
make contributions towards the energy and transport
infrastructure they need to export their production; they
might be obliged to partner the state in beneficiation
interventions; they might have to accept a minimum wage
system; they might be required to ratify a more compre-
hensive form of mining charter that sets out ambitious social
and political objectives; and they might be forced to commit
themselves to deeper black economic empowerment,
community development schemes, and contributions to
sectoral research and development institutions.
The Mangaung outcome always seemed likely to be
messy and not altogether comfortable for a mining industry
already labouring under difficult administrative, political, and
economic constraints. However, when the conference opened
on 16 December 2012 on the campus of the University of the
Free State, it became clear that nationalization had been
decisively excluded from consideration. Jacob Zuma’s
opening political report to the conference reflected the
complex balance of political forces he now confronts. In an
important change of direction, he laid down the law on
economic policy. Pre-conference speculation suggested the
youth league would make nationalization central to debate.
But Zuma refused to utter the word or to ‘delve’ into the
reasoning for rating agency downgrades.
He told delegates South Africa could not afford to alienate
potential investors in an unforgiving global economic climate.
In an indication that the voices of business people had been
heard, Zuma insisted the ANC needed unity of purpose in
economic policy and a reduction in policy uncertainty. 
Economic policy debate at the conference centred upon a
document prepared by the ETC that rejected ‘wholesale’ state
ownership and proposed only ‘strategic nationalisation’
where a firm rationale for it could be established. Instead of
pursuing changes of ownership, the conference endorsed a
resolution stating that ‘the state must capture an equitable
share of mineral resource rents and deploy them in the
interests of long-term economic growth, development and
transformation’. The conference delegated to government the
task of developing appropriate taxation and excise
mechanisms to realise this very broadly conceived ambition,
and Deputy Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene promised that
any such changes would only be introduced after careful
consultation with the mining industry. 
The conference also favoured proposals that particular
minerals might be designated as strategic in order to advance
developmental policy goals. It resolved to support more active
minerals beneficiation, the consolidation of public mining
assets into a state mining company, improved safety and
sustainability, and new broad-based economic empowerment
initiatives. The nationalization scare, at least for a time, was
over.
Conclusions
The deliberation about nationalization that occurred during
an extended ANC policy process brought a number of positive
consequences. After all, calls for nationalization – in a period
of heightened anti-capitalist and anti-colonial sentiment –
were managed. There were, however, costs that resulted from
policy uncertainty. And there are risks that accompany any
politically charged policy-making process. Symbolic policy
choices can be harnessed to political leadership struggles in
the ANC and its tripartite alliance partners, and the outcomes
therefore cannot be reliably predicted.
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The broader global environment continues to be one in
which demands for the fairer exploitation of natural resource
endowments will resonate with political activists and
ordinary citizens. The politics surrounding the extraction and
exploitation of mineral resources are therefore likely to
remain complex and sometimes heated. 
Mining companies will need to develop effective
partnerships with the governing party and with the trade
union movement to ensure that such pressures for change do
not translate into ill-considered policy change. Resource
nationalism is a global phenomenon that is bigger than any
political movement. It will take a partnership between social
actors to ensure that any negative repercussions that might
flow from it are managed, and that the discontents that fuel it
are mitigated.
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